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DELAWARE'S NEW SECTION 102(b)(7): BOON OR BANE
FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS?
INTRODUCTION
The obligations of a corporate director fall into two broad categories: a
duty of loyalty and a duty of care.' A corporate director pledges allegiance
to the enterprise and implicitly acknowledges that the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders must prevail over any personal interests. 2
This is otherwise known as a director's duty of loyalty. A corporate director
also is obligated to act carefully when he monitors and directs the activities
of corporate management.3 This is known as the duty of care.
The board of directors has an obligation to manage or supervise the
corporation's business 4 and is given great latitude in making decisions.' Due
to the business judgment rule, courts generally will not review business
decisions6 or second guess the board's judgment. 7 The business judgment
1. See Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment,
41 Bus LAW. 1187 (1986) (dividing directors' fiduciary duty into two components). See also
infra notes 14-118 and accompanying text.
2. Subcommittee on Functions and Responsibilities of Directors, of the Committee on
Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association,
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 13 (1976) [hereinafter Guidebook 1] (setting
forth basic fiduciary duties). See also Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTnA
L. REv. 93 (1979) (discussing fiduciary components); Manning, The Business Judgment Rule
and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1478 (1984)
(arguing for broader standards).
3. See supra note 2.
4. The general corporation laws provide that the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(a) (1983); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS Copu . ACT § 8.01 (1983).
5. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (court upheld
director's adoption of preferred share purchase rights plan as legitimate exercise of business
judgment); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (courts will not interfere with
business judgment absent particularized allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty). See also
Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1894, 1896-1902 (1983) (questions generally revolve around degree of discretion allowable in
fulfilling corporate duties).
6. Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 325, 147 A. 257, 261 (1929) (directors
presumed to make business decisions correctly). The business judgment rule is a tool of judicial
review, not a standard of conduct, and as such may be applied differently in varying contexts.
Compare Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch.) (sale of assets involving minority
stockholder who was granted preliminary injunction to enjoin sale of stock of wholly owned
subsidiary in view of value and speed with which directors acted in approving sale), aff'd in
part, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
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rule is a presumption that in making business decisions, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest
belief that they were acting in the best interests of the corporation.' Absent
proof of an abuse of discretion, the courts will respect the board's judgment.9
(Del. 1985) (decision by directors in response to takeover bid to affect self-tender offer for its
own shares based on board's good faith; action was informed and taken with due care).
7. Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 1973) (courts will not
interfere with directors' business judgments that are made "in good faith, with honest motives,
and for honest ends"); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (1966)
(courts will not interfere with directors' business judgment in absence of bad faith or gross
abuse); Bodell v. General Gas and Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 429, 140 A. 264, 268 (1927)
(transaction will not be scrutinized as long as acts of directors were performed in good faith,
in exercise of their best judgment, and for what directors believed to be advantage of corpo-
ration).
The Delaware Supreme Court formulated the principle of judicial deference by holding that
a board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will
not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (courts will not substitute their own notions of what
is or is not sound business judgment).
This scope of protection allows directors to make decisions that enable the board to function
without concern about a serious attack upon their decisions. See generally Block & Miller, The
Responsibilities & Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEc. REG. L.J.
44 (1983) (discussion of how far boards can go in deciding to fight takeovers); Block & Prussin,
The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW.
27 (1981) (boards have great discretion in decision-making); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why
Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CoRP. L. REV. 107 (1980) (how
boards should resist hostile advances); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35
Bus. LAW. 101 (1979) (how boards can best get business judgment rule protection); Veasey,
Seeking a Safe Harbor From Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business Decisions-An Analysis
of Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus. LAW. 1247 (1982)
(discussion of what directors must do to invoke business judgment rule).
8. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (plaintiff failed to sustain burden of
showing that directors' decision was tainted); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch. 1983)
("The business judgment rule ... is a presumption that a rational decision of an officer or
director is proper unless facts exist which remove the decision from the protection of the
rule."); Bodell v. General Gas and Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 426, 140 A. 264, 267 (1927)
(decisions will not be scrutinized as long as directors acted in good faith and for advantage of
corporation). See also Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (directors'
decisions made in good faith and based upon reasonable investigation and advice under
circumstances); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 156-57, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (1967)
(directors using reasonable business judgment not subject to accounting).
The purpose of the business judgment rule is to encourage risk taking. It enables corporations
to obtain competent guidance by minimizing the directors' exposure to liability and prevents
courts from making decisions in areas they are ill equipped to handle. Veasey, supra note 7,
at 1260-73 (discussion of distinction between role of courts and role of directors).
9. A plaintiff alleging that the board has breached its fiduciary duty has the burden of
proof in overcoming the rule's presumption of due care and good faith. See, e.g., Treadway
Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (directors did not breach any
fiduciary duties in attempting to win control of New Jersey corporation); Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff charged with burden of overcoming business judgment
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Thus, the business judgment rule has two major effects:' 0 (a) the rule prevents
courts from re-examining the merits of a director's diligent and good faith
rule), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
In recent Delaware decisions, courts have required the board, while initially bearing the
burden of proof, to demonstrate a rational purpose for its decision if its actions accomplish a
shift in the internal structure of the corporation whereby power is transferred from stockholders
to management. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984)
(management issuing new shares to ESOP which it controlled). But see Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985) (management implementing a poison pill).
Boards have been allowed to take a wide variety of actions, however, in response to takeover
threats, such as having a "white knight" seek an acquisition of the corporation. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985) (board of target
corporation had "white knight" acquire corporation in order to deter tender offer). A white
knight is a favored suitor. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir.
1981). Another action includes selling the "crown jewel." Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 291 (2d Cir. 1986) (selling SCM's food and pigment operation
in lockup option was not an abuse of discretion); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (Revlon entered lockup to prevent takeover). A
crown jewel is the most productive or profitable division of a company. Note, Lock-up Options:
Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1068, 1077 (1983). A board may also
undertake acquisitions to make the target less attractive or to pose antitrust problems. Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir. 1981) (Carter Hawley Hale purchase of
Marshall Field prevented based upon antitrust considerations). Alternatively, the board may
approve "pac-man" preemptive strikes or discriminatory self-tenders. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946
(discriminatory self-tenders allowable to oppose "inadequate and coercive" tender offers). The
pac-man defense is a target company's counter tender offer for the stock of the would-be
acquiror, made in response to an unwanted tender offer. Goiter v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d
1346, 1350 n.6 (Del. 1985). Finally, the board may adopt a "poison pill." Asarco Inc., v.
Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D.N.J. 1985) (corporation could issue preferred stock to make
takeover more difficult); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348 (business judgment rule applicable to defense
mechanism to ward off takeover attempt). For a definition of "poison pill," see infra note
173.
However, because of the inference that a director may be acting in his own interests, an
enhanced duty exists that calls for judicial examination before the protection of the business
judgment rule may be conferred. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. A Delaware board of directors
faced with this inherent conflict must show that it had reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed. A board can satisfy this burden by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (principles of "care, loyalty
and independence" must be satisfied before business judgment rule applies to actions in response
to takeover threats). The approval of a majority of outside directors who have not simply
deferred to management's wishes materially enhanced this proof. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
10. The business judgment rule has been advocated in cases of "transactional justification"
where an injunction is sought against board action. In this case, the focus is on the decision
itself rather than the liability of the decision maker. Veasey, New Insights Into Judicial Deference
to Directors' Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1466-75
(1984).
The former transactional setting is sometimes said to apply to the business judgment "rule"
while the latter is said to apply to the business judgment "doctrine." See Hinsey, Business
Judgment and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the
Doctrine and the Reality, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 609, 611-13 (1984) (distinguishes between
business judgment rule and business judgment doctrine).
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decision; and (b) the rule provides a presumption in a director's favor on
the issue of due care.1'
In response to a perceived misapplication of the business judgment rule,
the Delaware legislature recently passed a statute that limits the liability of
corporate directors.' 2 In order to grasp the full meaning of the new Delaware
statute and its implications for Delaware corporations, this Comment will
explore the duties of loyalty and care. It will then proceed to explain the
new statute that the Delaware legislature enacted, inter alia, to exempt
corporate directors from personal liability for breaches of their duty of
care.' 3 Finally, this Comment will use several cases to depict how the new
statute, although giving almost complete deference to the judiciary, will have
little effect on directors' potential liability in many takeover situations.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. The Duty of Care
The corporate director assumes the duty to act carefully when he directs
and monitors the activities of management.' 4 The Revised Model Business
Corporation Act sets forth the following legal standard:
11. The business judgment rule is flexible enough to allow for the possibility that other
people may disagree with a board's decision. Indeed, a board's decision, made with the proper
motivation and methodology, could be wrong and still withstand attack. See Moran v. House-
hold Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (upheld directors' adoption of preferred share
purchase rights plan as legitimate exercise of business judgment); Geller v. Tabas, 462 A.2d
1078, 1082 (Del. 1983) (decision to purchase silver futures contracts and U.S. Treasury bond
futures protected against judicial scrutiny); Huffington v. ENSTAR Corp., Nos. 7802, 7857,
slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1985) (directors protected by business judgment rule concerning
tender offer and sale of corporate assets agreed to be in best interests of shareholders); Reading
Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 483 A.2d 634 (Del. Ch. 1984) (interference with business decisions
should be avoided unless either statutory or case law indicates directors have overstepped their
bounds); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (board of directors
within its rights in relying upon informal personal investigations).
The view that directors should not take action on behalf of the corporation is inconsistent
with the majority of jurisdictions. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp.
623 (D. Md. 1982). But see American Int'l Rent-a-Car Corp. v. Cross, No. 7583, slip op. (Del.
May 9, 1984) (interference with business decisions should be avoided unless either statutory or
case law indicates directors have overstepped their bounds).
12. See infra notes 126-32.
13. Id.
14. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (common law legal standard binds directors
to use degree of care which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar
circumstances). See also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d
125, 130 (1963) (expressing standard as that which "ordinarily careful and prudent men would
use in like circumstances"). But cf. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 683-84 (1974) (discussion of Delaware's favorable tax, trust, and
corporation laws); Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1101 (1974) (discussion of need for federal standards for corporation law). Professor
Cary's opinion of Delaware law has been found to be extreme. See, e.g., Arsht, Reply To
Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976) (finding Cary's analysis biased and unscholarly).
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A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as
a member of a committee: 1) in good faith; 2) with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances; and 3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation.'"
When inquiring into the duty of care requirement of the business judgment
rule, a court examines whether or not directors have informed themselves
of all material information that is reasonably available prior to making a
business decision. 16 The judgment of the directors must be an informed one.
The court's inquiry must focus on the information and/or advice the board
had available to it, and whether or not it had sufficient opportunity to
acquire knowledge concerning the problem before making its decision.' 7
Directors have an affirmative duty to protect the financial interests of the
corporation and its stockholders and must proceed with a "critical eye" in
assessing information.' Therefore, in order to secure the protection of the
business judgment rule, the directors must have "brought their judgment to
bear with specificity on the challenged transaction . . . 19
In a tender offer, the directors of the target corporation must make a
fully informed and reasoned response. Also, the decision to oppose the
proposal must be made in good faith and must be for a rational business
purpose.20 If the target board did not fully consider the offer, or its consid-
eration of the offer was merely a sham, the directors violated their fiduciary
15. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984). The ABA's Committee on
Corporate Laws spent three years of debate on the original version of this formulation of the
business judgment rule. In revising the Model Business Corporation Act, the Committee drafted
no less than ten versions of the old section 35, and finally adopted it verbatim. See Manning,
The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time For Reality, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1477, 1478 (1984). It should be noted, however, that in its comment to the REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, the ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws stated that "[S]ection
8.30 does not try to codify the business judgment rule or to delineate the differences ...
between that rule and the standards of director conduct set forth in this section." REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984) (Committee Comment).
16. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (invocation of business judgment rule
.protection requires standard of care that is less exacting than simple negligence).
17. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (price paid to former director
for stock and noncompetition agreement determined in good faith); Puma v. Marriott, 283
A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971) (exchange of stock to obtain interest in other corporations
accomplished as result of "independent business judgment").
18. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985).
19. Id. See also Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp., 405 A.2d 134, 137 (Del. Ch. 1979)
(proposed merger could not be said to be grossly unfair or constitute fraudulent act on part
of board); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974) (shareholder injunction
granted based on conflicting evidence as to value of sale of stock in wholly owned subsidiary
and in view of speed with which board approved sale); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119,
124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (directors also involved as directors of other corporations with whom
corporation dealt); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 608, 171 A.2d 381, 396 (1961) (nonaffiliated
directors of investment company have same responsibility as ordinary directors of Delaware
corporation).
20. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
1988]
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duty.21 However, to show that the board's actions were outside the scope of
the business judgment rule, the plaintiff must prove that the board acted
without sufficient information and that it had approved an "unintelligent
and unadvised decision." ' 22
To determine whether or not a board of director's decision was sufficiently
informed, courts utilize a gross negligence standard. 23 Directors are not
expected to know all the intricacies of defensive tactics and they need not
read in total every contract or legal document that they approve.24 Directors
generally can demonstrate compliance with the duty of care if they: (a) prove
that they were supplied, in advance of a board meeting, with the documen-
tation of proposed or alternative courses of action, and (b) then show that
they conducted extensive discussions with their legal and financial advisors
in order to receive a full evaluation of the proposal's strengths and weak-
nesses.25
Frequently, however, the target board must respond quickly and may have
only a short time to evaluate the proposed offer and its possible alternatives. 26
If the board has a pre-planned defense, the board could be attacked for its
failure to fully consider the offer. 27 This timing problem is unique because
not only does the marketplace pressure the board into making a decision,
but the Securities and Exchange Commission also exerts pressure through
its disclosure requirements. 2 These rules require a target company to an-
nounce its position, with respect to a tender offer, within ten business days
of the date the offer is first published. 29 The target board must issue a
21. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 882. See also Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram
Indus., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 95,863 (D. Cal. Nov. 1976) (directors never fully
considered offer).
22. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch.) (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-
Western Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326, 330, 167 A. 831, 833 (1933)), aff'd per curiam, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974). Many courts, however, presumably would disregard the inference to the
"unintelligent" decision mentioned in Gimbel above. The Second Circuit has stated:
Directors are not specialists, like lawyers or doctors. They must have good sense,
and perhaps they must have acquaintance with affairs; but they need not-indeed,
perhaps they should not-have any technical talent. They are the general advisors
of the business, and if they faithfully give such ability as they have to their charge,
it would be harmful to hold them liable.
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1924).
23. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
873.
24. Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
25. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
26. Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) (board given forty-eight hours
to make decision).
27. The Moran court failed to fully consider this possibility when it approved the Household
board's adoption of a poison pill defense that was set in place before any attack was mounted
against the corporation. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
28. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1981). 15 U.S.C. §§
78(m)-(n) (1982). This statute is better known as the Williams Act.
29. See supra note 28.
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disclosure statement that recommends acceptance or rejection, or explicitly
states that it has no opinion or remains neutral with respect to the offer.3 0
This statement also must set forth the board's reasoning."'
Delaware courts have interpreted the Delaware Corporation Code as pro-
viding full protection to directors who rely in good faith on a corporate
officer's reports and informal personal investigations.3 2 However, such re-
ports must relate directly to the subject matter upon which the board is
called to act. Corporate officers, meanwhile, must provide all relevant
information to the board in order for the directors to rely on management's
reports. 33 The circumstances may be such that the board must make a
reasonable inquiry into any reports submitted to the board.3 For example,
the report might indicate that the company is a likely takeover target.
Delaware law does not require directors to obtain investment bankers'
evaluations or fairness opinions. 35 By relying on investment bankers, ac-
countants, and outside counsel, however, directors may better demonstrate
that their decision to resist a hostile takeover was made in good faith. But
reliance upon expert advice may not be used as a sham to cover a board's
otherwise improper action. 36
Although courts and legislatures have expressed differing standards of
care that directors must use, most variations still rely upon what the ordi-
narily prudent person under similar circumstances would do. 37 However, few
authors agree on the level of care required by such standards. The two tests
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1981). See also A & K R.R. Materials v. Green Bay & Western
R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636, 644 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (management must be careful to disclose all
possible conflicts of interest in connection with tender offer).
31. See supra note 30.
32. Section 141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states:
[A) member of the board of directors of any corporation organized under this
chapter . . . shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in
good faith upon the books of account or reports made to the corporation by any
of its officers, or by an independent certified public accountant . . . or in relying
in good faith upon other records of the corporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983).
33. Id.
34. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
35. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950-52 (Del. 1985) (management
fully briefed board before vote). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 862-70 (CEO and
CFO withheld valuation from board).
36. See generally Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980)
(board asked investment banker to prepare pro forma balance sheets of consolidated companies,
sent questions to target through investment banker, and adjourned for one week to "reflect on
the information"); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73 (discounting reports submitted
to board by in-house experts); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 342 (Del. Ch. 1984)
(failure to disclose with "complete candor" circumstances surrounding preparation of investment
banker's fairness opinions led to injunction against tender offeror standing on both sides of
transaction since it owed duty to target's minority shareholders).
37. See supra note 15.
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most often used are the ordinary care test,3s that uses ordinary negligence
to determine liability, and the gross negligence test.39
In Aronson v. Lewis,40 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business
judgment rule protects directors if they have informed themselves of all
material information reasonably available to them prior to making a business
decision.4' The board then can act with the requisite care to discharge its
duties.42 The court concluded that "under the business judgment rule director
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence."
'4 3
One year later, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,44 the Delaware Supreme Court
found Trans Union's board of directors grossly negligent after it had eval-
uated a merger proposal and recommended the merger for shareholder
approval.45 Faced with a very short deadline within which to respond to a
tender offer, the board met hastily and took action in a two hour meeting.
The court found this action, taken without advance notice, adequate con-
sideration, support staff, valuation information, or understanding of the
merger agreement, to be a breach of the directors' duty of care. 6 The court
accordingly denied the protection of the business judgment rule and held the
directors personally liable for damages that resulted from their actions.
4 7
The Van Gorkom decision has sparked intensive controversy and criticism
in the corporate boardroom because many decisions regarding tender offers
apparently are made in the same manner as the Trans Union board's
38. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 34, 432 A.2d 814, 823 (1981) (New Jersey
law uses ordinary negligence); Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 366, 199 A. 345, 347 (1938)
(directors must use reasonable and ordinary care, skill, and diligence).
39. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (directors' liability predicated upon
concepts of gross negligence); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses
and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (trustee's breach of fiduciary duty to
supervise management of hospital's investments). See generally Arsht & Hinsey, Codified
Standard-Same Harbor but Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980) (adoption
of section 35 of Model Business Corporation Act would give certainty to level of conduct
required of director); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnifi-
cation of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1101 (1968) (trend in affording
directors protection against liability should be curtailed); Veasey, supra note 10, at 1470 (analysis
of Delaware standard of care when gross negligence standard used); Veasey & Manning, Codified
Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care
Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980) (different formulations of applicable
standards of care may not necessarily render different results); Veasey & Seitz, The Business
Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALl Project-A
Strange Porridge, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1483 (1985) (discussion of desirability of codifying business
judgment rule).
40. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
41. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
45. Id. at 881.
46. Id. at 875.
47. Id. at 893.
[Vol. 37:411
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decision.4 8 In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the concept
of gross negligence in a very fact-specific situation. While both the Van
Gorkom and the Aronson decisions are based on the court's deference to
the business judgment of directors and the protection from liability that
flows therefrom, 49 the courts will require a board to investigate thoroughly
and carefully when making a decision. 0 If a board uses the services of an
outside expert to make its decision and shows its due diligence, Van Gorkom
illustrates that an expert's report must appear credible on its face. The board
may not blindly and uncritically accept the report.51
Less than four months after Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
retreated from its hard line stance in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.52
The court held that the business judgment rule protected Unocal's self-tender
offer for its own stock which arbitrarily excluded Mesa's holdings of Uno-
cal. 3 Unocal, unlike Van Gorkom, involved the business judgment rule in
both a defensive situation and in a claim that asserted the board's lack of
due care in taking hasty, significant, and costly action to thwart a tender
offer. In Unocal, T. Boone Pickens, Mesa's chairman, initiated a tender
offer for Unocal's stock.14 When the Unocal board of directors made its
own counter offer for all Unocal stock, except those shares that Pickens's
group held, Mesa sued, claiming that Unocal's offer was both unfair and
overly expensive. 5 The court stated that the Unocal board's actions were
"reasonably related to the threat posed." ' 56
Presently in Delaware, the duty of care requires a director to exercise the
judgment of the ordinarily prudent person. In a takeover situation, a director
must carefully evaluate all possible alternatives to invoke the protection of
the business judgment rule.5 7 In most instances, his decision need not be
intelligent, but must be informed. 8 Above all, a director must act in good
48. See Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
1437 (1985). Cf. Veasey & Seitz, supra note 39, at 1499 (indicating that the Trans Union
decision has been criticized).
49. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 815.
50. Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d at 890.
51. Id. at 883 n.25.
52. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
53. Id. at 952.
54. Pickens offered $54 per share for 37% of Unocal's stock. The remaining 63% of the
shareholders were to get subordinated debt. This was held to be coercive because it would force
shareholders into stampeding to get the cash so as not to be caught "holding the bag" with
debt. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949-52.
55. Id. at 953-54.
56. Id. at 955. But cf. EAC Indus. v. Frantz Mfg. Co., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) where
the court condemned the board's hastily called meeting amidst the aura of inevitability that
surrounded the transaction. The court distinguished this case from Unocal and held that the
business judgment rule will not protect a board where stockholder control has shifted and a
lame-duck board attempts a hasty defensive measure. Id. at 408.
57. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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faith and with a reasonable basis for believing that the action authorized is
legitimately in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.59
B. The Duty of Loyalty
In addition to his duty of care, a director owes a duty of loyalty to the
corporation.6 The basis for this duty is the director's responsibility to the
corporate shareholders. Most shareholders of large, publicly traded corpo-
rations are virtually powerless to influence control over the corporation.
Shareholders entrust the directors to oversee the management so as to protect
their investment.6' Directors, therefore, are charged with the duty of loyalty
to the corporation. 6
2
The duty of loyalty mandates that the director refrain from self-dealing.
63
In most instances, courts will strike down a board's approval of transactions
intended to enhance the personal financial gain of the directors who partic-
ipated in the decision. 64 When a director votes on such a transaction where
personal gain is involved, he becomes an "interested director." 65 At common
59. See generally Corporate Director's Guidebook: Comments Submitted by the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, 33 Bus. LAW. 321 (1978) [hereinafter Guidebook I] (discussion
of corporate directors' standards of conduct).
60. See generally ABA Corporate Laws Committee, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33
Bus. LAW. 1591, 1599 (1978) [hereinafter Guidebook III] (discussing basic fiduciary duties);
Goldstein, Revision of the Model Business Corporations Act, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1471 (1985)
(addresses applicability of 1984 amendments to Model Business Corporation Act provisions on
"corporate governance"); Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1383 (1983) (discussion of fiduciary principles as basis for duty of loyalty obligation).
61. See Ruder, Protections for Corporate Shareholders: Are Major Revisions Needed?, 37
U. Mi i L. RaV. 243 (1983) (review of current state and federal laws and regulations including
description of various proposals for changes of such laws).
62. Statements on fiduciary duty by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,
164 N.E. 545 (1928) are frequently quoted:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions.
Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546. Cf. Electronic Dev. Co. v. Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 540, 28 N.W.2d
130, 139 (1927) ("[The] property of the corporation constitutes a trust fund in the hands of its
officers and directors, and a transaction between them whereby the corporation's property is
diverted from the corporation to their own use and benefit will not be upheld.").
63. See generally Guidebook I, supra note 2, at 14 (director must present opportunity to
corporation first).
64. See Id. at 13.
65. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984) (instituting a "demand futility test" to
determine whether directors are disinterested and independent); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[Dlirectors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect
to derive any personal financial benefit ..."); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch.
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law, interested director transactions were voidable regardless of the fairness
to the corporation or the approval of disinterested directors. 66 By 1960,
transactions were not voidable if they were fair to the corporation and if a
majority of disinterested directors approved the transaction. 67
Many states have since codified a director's duty by adopting "safe
harbor" statutes. In the majority of states, the safe harbor statute will
validate a transaction where a conflict exists if: (1) either informed directors
or a majority of stockholders approve the decision; or (2) the decision is
shown to be fair on its face.68 The rationale behind such legislation is that
when a board is fully informed and still votes to authorize the transaction,
such a business decision is outside the court's realm. 69 Similarly, disinterested,
fully informed shareholder approval "sanitizes" an interested director's
transaction. 70
Delaware has adopted such a safe harbor statute.7' The business judgment
rule is invoked if the fully informed, disinterested directors or a majority of
1977) (plaintiff failed to establish that management abused discretion in purchase of former
director's stock and noncompetition agreement); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d
548 (1964) (directors not bound by statements in minutes that stock option plan was motivating
reason for authorization of purchase of company's shares).
66. Such transactions were voidable at the suit of a shareholder or the corporation. See
Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651 (1880); Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 88 Ala.
630, 7 So. 108 (1889); Davis v. Mallory-Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 131, 23 A. 708 (1891); European
& North Am. Ry. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277 (1871); Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal
& Iron Co., 16 Md. 456 (1860); Pearson v. Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 537 (1883). See also Marsh,
Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36
(1966) (transactions voidable irrespective of fairness).
67. See Marsh, supra note 66, at 43 (by 1960, general rule was that no transaction was
automatically voidable at suit of shareholder); Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor's
Status Report, 40 Bus. LAW. 1383, 1388 (1983) (contract voidable at insistence of corporation
or its shareholders if majority of board is interested, irrespective of question of fairness).
68. According to the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations, § 508 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984), thirty-eight states have adopted safe
harbor statutes. Thirty-five of these states preclude attack on a transaction when disinterested
directors or shareholders approve it following disclosure. Twenty-two statutes only require
disclosure of the director's interest in the transaction. Sixteen states explicitly require disclosure
of both the conflict of interest and the material facts concerning the transaction.
69. Id.
70. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 178-79, 91 A.2d 57, 58 (when
shareholders ratified directors' approval of stock option plans, objecting shareholder had burden
to prove lack of sound business judgment), rev'd and remanded, 33 Del. 283, 92 A.2d 594
(1952) (in action to cancel option agreement, court required proof that value of options was
disproportionate as consideration with respect to services rendered).
71. The statute provides as follows:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partner-
ship, association, or other organization in which one or more of its directors or
officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or
voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present
at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the
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shareholders ratify the action. The statute does not mandate judicial inquiry.12
The court's only inquiry is whether or not the consideration paid in the
transaction was so inadequate that a reasonable person would conclude that
the transaction was a gift or a waste of corporate assets.
73
Questions regarding the duty of loyalty may arise in various other contexts,
but can be categorized in four general areas: fairness, conflict of interest,
corporate opportunity, and confidentiality.7 4 In order to focus upon the
procedural considerations that often determine these issues, one must decide:
(a) if adequate disclosure was made to the decision makers; (b) if the
transaction with the alleged conflict of interest received independent scrutiny;
(c) if the burden of proving a breach of the duty of loyalty was met; and
(d) if the transaction was fair. 75 The four general areas that comprise the
duty of loyalty will be discussed in detail below.
1. Fairness
A corporate director always must be aware of his obligation of fairness.
If a transaction involves the corporation and an interested director, creating
a possible conflict of interest, the transaction must receive the entire board's
primary attention. 76 The usual standard is whether or not the proposed
transaction, involving an interested director, is as favorable to the corpo-
ration as one from an outside source. 77 If the transaction might adversely
affect minority shareholders, all directors must be concerned with their
contract or transaction, or solely because his or their votes are counted for such
purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or
transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee,
and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by
the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the
disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or
transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon,
and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by a vote of
the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the
shareholders.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1974). Cf. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984)
(articulating directors' conflict of interest transactions).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1974).
73. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625-26 (Del. 1984) (excessive payments to directors
and officers from compensation plan tied to stock's market price).
74. See ABA Corp. Laws Committee, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591
(1978).
75. Ruder, supra note 67, at 1387.
76. Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (president misappropriated stock options
for himself). See also Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 39-43 (1966) (approval of disinterested directors required).
77. Guidebook I, supra note 2, at 13.
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obligations, especially if the transaction pits a dominant or controlling
shareholder against the minority holders. 78
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,79 the Delaware Supreme Court required
"entire" fairness in interested director transactions. Entire fairness requires
a showing of both fair dealing and fair price. 0 Fair dealing centers on the
timing of the transaction: how it is initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed,
and the manner in which the directors and shareholders approve the trans-
action. 8' Fair price embraces both economic and financial considerations.8 2
The Weinberger court noted that the test for fairness is not split between
fair dealing and fair price.8 3 All aspects of the issue are examined as a
whole. 84 Whether or not management adequately discloses information to
disinterested directors is an issue in the analysis of fair dealing.85 Nevertheless,
if the price is fair, inadequate disclosure may not necessarily establish an
independent basis for invalidating an interested transaction. 6 As long as the
entire transaction is fair within the meaning of Weinberger, the transaction
will be upheld.
8 7
78. For cases that go into depth on the obligations of majority shareholders to minority
shareholders, see Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) and Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
79. 457 A.2d 701 (1983). See also Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 599-
600 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("When the test of the intrinsic fairness of a self-interested transaction is
employed, the ultimate question is whether the terms of the transaction itself are entirely or
intrinsically fair.").
80. 457 A.2d at 711.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under
Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44, 46-47 (1977) (analysis of financial and economic aspects
of fairness doctrine); Moore, The "Interested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 674, 676 (1979) (discussion of Intrinsic Fairness Doctrine). But see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262(h) (1974) (providing appraisal remedy for shareholders dissatisfied with payment
to be received in cash-out merger). The Weinberger court indicated that this appraisal remedy
may be inadequate where there has been fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, gross overreach-
ing, or a waste of corporate assets. 457 A.2d at 714. For more opinions construing the
Weinberger appraisal remedy, see Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 1984);
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 480 A.2d 655, 660 (Del. Ch. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Wilen v. Pollution Control Indus., No. 7524, slip op.
(Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1984).
83. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d at 711.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Post-Weinberger decisions underscoring the procedural problems include: Rabkin v.
Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 480 A.2d 655 (Del. Ch. 1984) (absence of shareholder allegations
of nondisclosure or misrepresentation prevented recovery for damages due to breach of fiduciary
duty), rev'd on other grounds, 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Wilen v. Pollution Control Indus.,
No. 7524, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1984) (the "[Absence of arm's length negotiations,
standing alone, does not state a legally cognizable claim."); Lewis & Marewich v. Chanan
Indus., No. 7738, slip op. (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 1984) (nondisclosure of certain appraisals of
assets and tax loss carryforwards in tender offer and merger proposal not considered material);
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The Delaware safe harbor statute"s then provides that a transaction with
an interested director is not void solely due to a conflict of interest, provided
that: (a) full disclosure of all facts relating to the transaction has been made;
and (b) a majority of disinterested directors or shareholders approve the
transaction in good faith.8 9 Otherwise, the transaction will be valid only if
it can be shown to be fair to the corporation. 90 The burden of proof in this
situation will be on the directors. 91 In Fliegler v. Lawrence,92 for example,
the Delaware Supreme Court determined that because the defendants were
involved on both sides of the transaction, the burden was on them to
demonstrate its intrinsic fairness. 93
2. Conflicts of interest
Closely related to the concept of fairness is the duty to refrain from self-
dealing. 94 When a corporate director has a material interest in a proposed
transaction, the director must disclose the extent and nature of such interest
to the other directors before the board of directors takes action. 95 The
interested director should then abstain from voting on the particular trans-
action and all related transactions. The interested director also must be aware
of voting and quorum requirements. In Delaware, the interested director's
Weinberger & Star v. Meenan Oil Co., Nos. 7291, 7310, slip op. (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1984) (no
finding of material nondisclosures led to dismissal of complaint for breach of fiduciary duty).
But cf. Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 1984) (minority met the burden of
showing reasonable probability that majority had not offered fair price). See also Berger &
Allingham, A New Light in Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses Singer, 39 Bus. LAW. 1
(1983) (comparison of Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) and Weinberger); Henzel
& Coiling, Squeeze Out Mergers in Delaware-The Delaware Supreme Court Decision in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 7 CORP. L. REV. 195 (1984) (general discussion of Weinberger).
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1953).
89. Id.
90. The principle Delaware case, deciding the circumstances under which the fairness test
is applicable, is Puma v. Marriott, 282 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971). In Puma, the disinterested
directors persuaded the court not only of their independence, but also of their care in negotiating
fair terms. The court ultimately held that the business judgment rule applied and that it would
not make its own determination of fairness. Id. at 695.
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1953).
92. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
93. Id. at 222. In Fliegler, approximately one-third of the disinterested shareholders voted.
Id. In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), the court held that where a
parent controls a subsidiary and also controls a transaction between itself and the subsidiary,
the burden of proof may shift to the parent to defend the transaction, and a standard of
"intrinsic fairness" may be applied. Id. at 720. See also Ruder, supra note 67, at 1389-90
(taking strict view of conflict of interest cases). But see Gottlieb v. Hayden Chem. Corp., 33
Del. Ch. 177, 178-79, 91 A.2d 57, 58 (1952) (where directors vote to give themselves stock
options subject to shareholders' ratification, burden of proof shifts to objector), rev'd and
remanded, 33 Del. Ch. 283, 92 A.2d 594 (1953).
94. See Guidebook I, supra note 2, at 13.
95. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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attendance will count in determining quorum, while his vote of consent will
not.9
Delaware court decisions suggest that material circumstances and infor-
mation that indicate a possible conflict of interest on the part of one or
more directors may have to be disclosed. 97 A prudent board should make
disclosures if conflicts exist. 9 The disclosure parameters, therefore, are
defined more efficiently by what need not be disclosed.
Generally, no duty exists to clutter a document with insignificant infor-
mation provided that, viewed in its entirety, it gives directors all relevant
material necessary to decide how to vote on an issue.9 Corporate officials
are not required to admit alleged wrongdoing' ° or mismanagement, to
speculate on improper motives, l'0 or to draw inferences from facts. 0 2 The
rationale is that the board would otherwise be required to admit possible
wrongdoing before the document is admitted in a court of law. 0° Facts need
not be disclosed that are known or reasonably available to the shareholders.°4
Opinions, conclusions, speculation, or legal theories do not have to be
disclosed.105 Management also has no obligation to give shareholders legal
or investment advice, such as who may legally challenge a merger or the
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1953).
97. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876-78 (Del. 1985) (proxy statement
defective in failing to disclose fact that member of management prepared preliminary valuation
report to justify price offered in leveraged buy-out proposal). See also Weinberger v. United
Fin. Corp. of Cal., 405 A.2d 134, 136 (Del. Ch. 1982) (proxy statement allegedly failed to
disclose that two directors of company would continue to be employed after solicited merger).
98. Cf. Weingaden v. Meenan Oil Co., No. 7397, slip op. (Del. Ch. 1985) (need not disclose
tax advantages accruing to two directors through merger because not material).
99. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 31295, slip op. (Del. Dec. 30, 1987) (no duty to
disclose general merger discussions or casual inquiries). See also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976) (document must contain all facts that reasonable shareholder might consider
important); Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d 1089, 1100 (Del. Ch.) (reasonable shareholder could
understand since outline of acquisition was disclosed), aff'd, 467 A.2d 1274 (Del. 1983); Lynch
v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (directors must disclose only germane
facts to shareholders).
100. A & K R.R. Materials v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636, 644 (E.D. Wis.
1977) (if any statements are made, they must not be materially misleading).
101. Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 961 (Del. Ch. 1980) (plaintiff must prove
improper motives).
102. Cf. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) (majority stockholder
is fiduciary and has burden of showing good faith and inherent fairness of proposed transaction).
103. Seibert v. Harper & Row Pub., No. 6639, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984) (proxy
statement not defective in failing to disclose that termination of retirement plan allegedly would
serve no proper purpose and would impair corporation's ability to attract management). See
also Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp. of Cal., 405 A.2d 134, 136-37 (Del. Ch. 1982) (board
not required to admit alleged'failure to consider merger proposal prior to acceptance). But see
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 891 (Del. 1985) (board should have admitted that no
valuation of company was made).
104. Siebert v. Harper & Row Pub., No. 6639, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984) (need not
disclose fact that investment banker considered value of control premium in giving opinion of
fairness of price).
105. Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Nos. 7899, 7972, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 3, 1986)
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 37:411
nature of an expert's opinion on the fair value of its stock, 1' 6 nor does
management have a duty to disclose alternatives to the merger proposal. 0 7
Finally, the board is not obligated to disclose any other parties' inquiries
into the purchase of the corporation. 0 8 Thus, the duty of loyalty requires
an examination of disinterestedness and the quality and quantity of disclo-
sure. Exactly when a fairness showing is required will depend upon the facts
and circumstances surrounding each case.
3. Corporate opportunity
A well-recognized common law principle holds that one entrusted with the
management of a corporation, such as an officer or director, occupies a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation and may not exploit his position
by appropriating to himself a business opportunity that properly belongs to
the corporation.'09 If personal gain usurps such a business opportunity, the
opportunities and property acquired by the fiduciary are subject to a con-
structive trust for the benefit of the corporation. 110 This principle, known as
the doctrine of corporate opportunity, derives from agency theory whereby
the agent owes the duties of good faith and loyalty to the principal."'
The initial inquiry is to determine whether or not the opportunity was one
that belonged to the corporation. Courts have struggled with different tests
to resolve this question. 112 Delaware courts have indicated that an opportunity
(need not disclose plaintiff's opinion on illegality of proposed recapitalization plan); Siebert,
No. 6639, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984) (need not disclose shareholder's opposition to
repossession proposal).
106. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (directors must disclose to
stockholders all information that reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding
whether to sell stock). See also Fisher v. United Technologies Corp., No. 5847, slip op. (Del.
Ch. May 12, 1981) (proxy statements are not intended to provide legal advice to stockholders
wishing to oppose a transaction), reprinted in 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 384.
107. See supra note 106.
108. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 5830, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 1984).
109. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (entrepreneur
misappropriated Pepsi-Cola formula). See also Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E.
545 (1928) (Judge Cardozo applied the corporate opportunity doctrine in partnership setting).
110. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939) (discussing corporate
loyalties). See generally Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARv.
L. REV. 997 (1981) (criticizing vague standards applied in corporate opportunity context).
S111. See supra note 60.
112. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222-23, 222 N.W.2d 71, 79-80 (1974). The court stated:
We have searched the case law and commentary in vain for an all-inclusive or
'critical' test or standard by which a wrongful appropriation can be determined and
are persuaded that the doctrine is not capable of precise definition. Rather, it
appears that courts have opened or closed the business opportunity door to corporate
managers upon the facts and circumstances of each case and by application of one
or more of three variant but often overlapping tests or standards: (1) The 'interest
or expectancy' test, which precludes acquisition by corporate officers of the property
of a business opportunity in which the corporation has a 'beachhead' in the sense
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belongs to a corporation if it falls either directly within the corporation's
line of business or at least in an area where the corporation has a general
interest." 3 Generally, when an outsider presents a business opportunity to a
corporate officer that the corporation is financially able to undertake, and
that falls in the line of the corporation's business and is of practical advantage
to it, or is an opportunity in which the corporation has an actual or expectant
interest, the officer is prohibited from taking the opportunity for himself." 4
The types of activities included in the corporation's line of business also
must be examined. These are activities that the corporation has the ability
and experience to pursue and that are consistent with its reasonable needs
and aspirations for expansion."' If the opportunity is closely tied to the
corporation's business, a director who takes such opportunity for himself
may find himself liable for his actions." 6
4. Confidentiality
The director should deal in confidence with all matters involving his
corporation until general public disclosure is made." 7 The confidentiality of
of a legal or equitable interest or expectancy growing out of a preexisting right or
relationship; (2) the 'line of business' test, which characterizes an opportunity as
corporate whenever a managing officer becomes involved in an activity intimately
or closely associated with the existing or prospective activities of the corporation;
and (3) the 'fairness' test, which determines the existence of a corporate opportunity
by applying ethical standards of what is fair and equitable under the circumstances.
Id.
113. Equity Corp. v. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 165, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (1966). In Science
Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 1980), the court examined
the corporation's financial ability to take advantage of the opportunity, whether or not it was
within the corporation's line of business, and whether or not the corporation had an interest
in the opportunity.
114. Equity Corp. v. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. at 164, 221 A.2d at 497 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
23 Del. Ch. 225, 269, 5 A.2d 503, 509-10 (1939)). See also Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,
221 (Del. 1976) (defendant directors have burden of showing intrinsic fairness of the transaction);
Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834, 836 (Del. 1971) (directors not liable for failing to offer
opportunity to corporation, since corporation turned down identical offer one month before);
Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 517 (Del. Ch. 1978) (plaintiff stockholders have no standing
to complain if defendants' transaction was fully disclosed to all shareholders); Johnston v.
Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 489, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (1956) (director of corporation has burden
of showing transaction is fair); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or. 662, 683-84, 695 P.2d 906, 915
(1985) (corporate officer, acting for new corporation, misappropriated opportunity and could
not contend that original corporation did not have financial ability to pursue opportunity). But
see Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1967) (because plaintiff knew that defendant
directors owned similar corporations when plaintiff asked them to be on his board, defendants
did not have to bring opportunities to plaintiff's corporation first); Solimine v. Hollander, 128
N.J. Eq. 228, 252, 16 A.2d 203, 214-15 (1940) (corporation has no expectant interest in
opportunity if it comes to director in individual capacity).
115. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. at 279, 5 A.2d at 514.
116. Id. at 280, 5 A.2d at 514.
117. Guidebook III, supra note 60, at 1600.
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all current corporate and board information should be presumed. The need
for such confidentiality is very strong, not only because disclosure could
have harmful effects on the corporation's position in the competitive mar-
ketplace, but also because the federal Security and Exchange Commission
regulations against insider trading could expose both the corporation and
the individual to financial liability." 8
A board of directors has many requirements that it must follow. The
board must adhere to the many facets of both the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty. As will be seen, the Delaware courts have not made the director's
job any easier due to their many conflicting decisions. Noting the problems
corporate directors encountered in adhering to the varied parameters of the
duties of care and loyalty, the Delaware legislature enacted section 102(b)(7)
of the Delaware Corporate Code.
1I. SECTION 102(b)(7) OF THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW
Since 1950, a system has developed whereby corporate governance is based
on the concept that large public corporations should have a majority of
outside, independent directors on their boards." 9 Recent courts have given
increased emphasis to independent board decisions. 20 Many courts have even
denied the benefit of the business judgment rule to those boards that do not
have an independent majority.' 2' This encourages shareholders to elect di-
rectors who are independent and whose main interest will be in the share-
holders they serve. Obviously, this system of outside directors depends upon
the willingness of qualified persons to serve on the board.
118. Id. See also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 420 (1909) (officer may not buy shares of
minority shareholder without disclosing special circumstances); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan.
530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) (director may not purchase shares from minority shareholder without
disclosing material facts); Ruder, supra note 67, at 1398-99 (common law roots of insider
trading doctrine).
119. Auerbach V. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 625, 393 N.E.2d 994, 997 (1979) (special committee
of outside directors); Barr v. Wachman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 374, 329 N.E.2d 180, 183 (1975)
(eleven of sixteen outside directors).
120. Problems of "structural bias," however, continue to exist since most directors are either
friends of the insider officers or act at the pleasure of the insiders. See Zapata v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (corporation must prove independence and good faith of
directors). But see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (discounting structural bias).
See also Dent, Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the
Derivative Suit? 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 111-15 (1980) (difficulty of maintaining independence
of outside directors).
121. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957) (stockholder may sue when majority of
board is subject to control of corporation); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (stockholder must have opportunity to test independence of special committee); Republic
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (business judgment rule valid
when board of directors is independent and disinterested); Gilbert v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 179
Misc. 641, 38 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1942) (plaintiff must prove that directors had knowledge of or
participated in illegal activities).
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In the past few years, however, several factors developed that make it less
likely that corporations will be able to attract and retain high caliber outside
directors. The first factor was a severe decline in the scope of coverage and
the availability of liability insurance to directors and officers.122 Secondly,
courts were increasingly willing to impose staggering personal liability upon
directors for actions that involved breaches of their fiduciary duties to
shareholders. 2s Finally, these developments occurred when corporations were
faced with the increased likelihood of litigation against directors. 24 Unfor-
tunately, corporations in industries that required the most imaginative lead-
ership could not obtain adequate director and officer insurance coverage. 2
In 1985, in response to the increasing scarcity of qualified, disinterested
directors, the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association
formed a committee to develop solutions to alleviate these problems. 2 6 The
committee first considered legislation that was designed to greatly expand
the power of Delaware corporations to indemnify directors and officers. 27
122. See generally Ailing Director and Officer Insurance Market Looks for Cure, Bus. LAW.
UPDATE 1 (Mar./Apr. 1986) (citing restrictive cost of director and officer insurance); Director
Insurance Drying Up, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (discussing how insurance companies
are getting out of director and officer lines); Business Struggles to Adapt as Insurance Crisis
Spreads, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31, col. 4 (discussing how companies are self-insuring);
Insurers Beginning to Refuse Coverage on Directors and Officers in Takeover Cases, Wall St.
J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 3, col. 2 (discussing large judgments against directors found liable in
takeover contests); Liability Insurance is Difficult to Find Now for Directors, Wall St. J., July
10, 1985, at 10, col. 2 (noting few insurers left in the business).
123. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (Trans Union directors
personally liable for millions of dollars).
124. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 949-52 (Del. 1985). The
oil industry was going through a tremendous shakeout in 1983-1985. This consolidation, led by
Mesa's T. Boone Pickens, made board members of even the largest oil concerns very nervous.
125. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 662 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Wash. 1986)
($110 million settlement in action against former directors). See generally Block, Barton &
Garfield, Advising Directors on the Director and Officer Insurance Crisis, 14 SEc. REG. L.J.
130 (1986); Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged
Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 (1987) (approaches
to deal with director's liability); Ahrons, The Job Nobody Wants, 2986 Bus. Wk. 56 (Sept. 8,
1986); The Director and Officer Crisis: Corporate Boardroom Woes Grow, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
4, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (problem of expanding liability in takeover battles).
126. The legislative synopsis, adopted on June 18, 1986, stated:
Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments to Section 145 represent a legislative response
to recent changes in the market for directors' liability insurance. Such insurance
has become a relatively standard condition of employment for directors. Recent
changes in that market, including the unavailability of traditional policies ... have
threatened the quality and stability of the governance of Delaware corporations
because directors have become unwilling to serve without the protection which such
insurance provides and may be deterred from making entrepreneurial decisions. The
amendments are intended to allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute
protection in various forms to their directors and to limit Director liability in certain
circumstances.
LEoISLArrVE SNOPSIS to S. 533, 133d Del. Gen. Assembly (1986).
127. See S. 533, 133d Del. Gen. Assembly § 2 (1986) and comments thereto.
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While certain minor amendments to the indemnification provisions of the
statute were retained,1 21 the committee ultimately submitted legislation that
128. Changes were made in section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law which
governs indemnification of directors, officers, employees, and agents. A synopsis of these
changes is as follows:
Section 145(b), as in effect prior to the new amendments, required court approval
before there could be any indemnification for expenses incurred in derivative actions
where the defendant had been found liable 'for negligence or misconduct in the
performance of his duty . . . .' (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b)). The amendments
dropped the quoted language in order to make the statute consistent with the
decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985) and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), to the effect that
directors are liable only for gross negligence where violations of their duty of care
are alleged. The amendments do not alter the requirement for court approval before
indemnification for expenses may be had in derivative suits which have resulted in
an adjudication of liability.
Section 145(e) authorizes a corporation to advance litigation expenses to an officer
or director prior to the final disposition of an action. This section conditions the
making of such advances upon the defendant giving the corporation an undertaking
to repay if it turns out that indemnification is not available. The 1986 amendments
change the form of the director's or officer's undertaking from a promise to repay
'unless it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be indemnified' to a
promise to repay 'if it shall ultimately be determined that he is not entitled to be
indemnified.'
This change shifts the burden of going forward to obtain the required finding as
to entitlement to indemnification from the claimant to the corporation. While the
amendment may make signing the undertaking more palatable, its effect is more
symbolic than real since the statute continues to require, at Section 145(d), that
indemnification be authorized pursuant to a finding that the indemnitee has met
the statutory standard. Hence, the board, by a majority of disinterested directors,
the stockholders, or, as the statute permits, independent legal counsel, will still have
to decide whether indemnification is warranted in each case.
A more substantive change in Section 145(e) is reflected in the 1986 amendments'
deletion of the requirement that advances of litigation expenses be 'as authorized
by the board of directors in the specific case.' The quoted language, which has
been eliminated, suggested that directors must evaluate each request for an advance
on an individual basis. This raised questions as to the validity of charter or by-law
provisions, or individual contracts of indemnification, which purport to obligate
the corporation to make advances whenever an officer or director proffers an
undertaking in proper form. The deletion of the quoted language facilitates such a
general authorization.
Section 145(f) of the General Corporation Law states that the indemnification
authorized by Section 145 is not exclusive of any other rights to indemnification
which a director, officer, employee or agent may have under a by-law, agreement,
board or stockholder resolution 'or otherwise.' This non-exclusive feature of the
Delaware statute and other state statutes modelled on it contrasts sharply with state
indemnification statutes which expressly limit permissible indemnification to that
provided in the statute. The scope and intent of the non-exclusive language of
Section 145(f) has been much debated. In recent times, because of the shrinking
availability and coverage of liability insurance, corporations have looked to this
provision as a basis for granting more expansive indemnification. Where directors'
and officers' liability coverage has been cancelled or becomes too expensive, or
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permitted shareholders to limit liability if they so chose.129 Such a limitation
is analogous to principles of trust law which contemplate that beneficiaries
may agree to limit the liability of trustees.'30 The State Bar Association
theorized that an amendment of this type would be a more direct approach
and would fit well within the traditional enabling character of section 102.131
The Delaware legislature adopted verbatim the 1986 amendments that the
Corporate Law Section proposed. The new law, section 102(b)(7), became
effective on July 1, 1986.132
Section 102 of the Delaware General Corporation Law sets forth what is
to be included in a certificate of incorporation.' While section 102(a)
where new exclusions in the insurance contract make its value questionable, cor-
porate lawyers have tried to formulate charter and by-law provisions and individual
contracts of indemnification which will substitute for the insurance in whole or in
part.
The 1986 amendments do not elucidate the scope of the non-exclusive language
of Section 145(f). However, they do make it clear that advances of expenses are
meant to be included within the non-exclusivity concept so that a director's or
officer's right to have his litigation expenses paid by the corporation in advance of
the disposition of the proceeding may be expanded and other rights relating thereto
may be granted by a by-law provision or contract so long as no public policy is
offended.
The 1986 amendments also change Section 145(f) by moving to a new Section
1450) language indicating that the indemnification provided by the statute continues
as to a person who ceases to be a director, officer, employee or agent and inures
to the benefit of his heirs, executors and administrators. It was thought that this
provision should be in a free-standing subsection of Section 145 since it relates to
the entire section. No substantial change was intended.
LEGISLATrVE SYNoPsIs to S. 533, 133d Del. Gen. Assembly (1986). See also Letters from Black,
Sparks & Johnston, partners at the firm of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunel to their clients
(May 7, 1986 and June 18, 1986) (explaining amendments).
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959). Possibly, the certificate of incor-
poration of Delaware corporations could have been amended to limit or eliminate liability of
directors without enabling legislation under pre-existing law, by analogizing to trust law as set
forth in an old English Chancery decision, In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates, Ltd.,
1 Ch. 425 (1911), which appears to sanction a corporation charter provision limiting liability.
See also Directors Liability Act of 1890, 53 & 54 VICT. 516, 517, Ch. 64 (1890) (limiting
directors' liability for statements made in prospectus); Derry v. Peek, 14 H.L.(E) 337 (1889)
(directors not personally liable for misstatements in prospectus). The Directors Liability Act
was passed in response to Derry v. Peek. For a modern English version, see Viscount of the
Royal Count of Jersey v. Barry Shelton, 1 W.L.R. 985, 986 (1986) (insulating directors from
liability for negligent acts).
131. See S. 533, 133d Del. Gen. Assembly (1986) and supporting comments.
132. Id.
133. The new section 102(b)(7) states as follows:
In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of incorporation
by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain
any or all of the following matters: . . . (7) A provision eliminating or limiting the
personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision
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identifies what a company must include in its certificate of incorporation, it
is only an enabling provision. Generally, section 102(b)(7) provides companies
with the option of including a provision in the certificate of incorporation
that is intended to limit the directors' exposure to personal monetary lia-
bility. 3 4 To achieve the protection that the new legislation authorizes, a
corporation must either amend its certificate of incorporation to add the
liability-limiting provision, or include such a provision in its original certif-
icate of incorporation.' By the terms of the statute, any provision so adopted
will have a prospective effect only, and will not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director for any act or omission that occurs prior to its adoption.136
The statute specifically states that a corporation may not eliminate or limit
the liability of its directors in all situations. Directors will always be liable
for: a) breaches of their duty of loyalty, b) acts or omissions in bad faith,
c) acts involving intentional misconduct or knowing violations of law, d)
violations of section 174 of the General Corporation Law, 3 7 or e) any
shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law; (iii) under sec. 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall
eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior
to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in the paragraph
to a director shall also be deemed to refer to a member of the governing body of
a corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).
134. Id.
135. In order to amend its certificate of incorporation, a Delaware corporation must follow
section 242(b)(1) which states:
(1) If the corporation has capital stock, its board of directors shall adopt a
resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and
either calling a special meeting of the stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof
for the consideration of such amendment or directing that the amendment proposed
be considered at the next annual meeting of the stockholders .... If a majority of
the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon, and a majority of the outstanding
stock of each class entitled to vote thereon as a class has been voted in favor of
the amendment, a certificate setting forth the amendment and certifying that such
amendment has been duly adopted in accordance with this section shall be executed,
acknowledged, filed, and recorded ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1953).
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
137. Section 174 holds Delaware corporate directors liable for improper payment of dividends
or improper stock purchases or redemptions. The text of section 174 is as follows:
(a) In case of any wilful or negligent violation of sec. 160 or 173 of this title,
the directors under whose administration the same may happen shall be jointly and
severally liable, at any time within 6 years after paying such unlawful dividend if
after such unlawful stock purchase or redemption, to the corporation, and to its
creditors in the event of its dissolution or insolvency, to the full amount of the
dividend unlawfully paid, or to the full amount unlawfully paid for the purchase
or redemption of the corporation's stock, with interest from the time such liability
accrued ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174(a) (1953).
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transaction from which the director derives an improper personal benefit.13s
In essence, the new legislation permits a corporation to protect its directors
from monetary liability for duty of care violations alone.
Nevertheless, although not explicitly stated, section 102(b)(7) does not
completely eliminate the duty of care imposed on directors. Directors con-
tinue to have fiduciary duties in the decision-making process and in their
oversight responsibilities. For example, the duty of care continues to be
vitally important in injunction and rescission cases, and may be relevant in
other contexts. 39 The statute simply allows a cap to be placed on directors'
personal monetary liability.
In more general terms, implementation of section 102(b)(7) allows a charter
provision to be written broadly to provide that directors are not liable to
the corporation or its shareholders for breaches of their fiduciary duties
except as otherwise required by the law. It could also impose specific
limitations on such liability. Accordingly, the new section could be viewed
as a cap on directors' liability that may take the form of a stated maximum
dollar amount for which directors may be liable, either individually or
collectively. Other limitations also could be imposed such as conditioning
the relief from liability on directors taking specific action' 40 or limiting
liability in connection with certain specific matters.' 4'
138. See supra note 133.
139. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) (fiduciary relationship with
stockholders); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 92,863 (6th Cir. 1986)
(defendants enjoined from pursuing tender offer). But cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161
(1981) (explores target manager's duty).
140. Some commentators have suggested that the new legislation exempts directors from
liability for reckless actions that fall between ordinary negligence and intentional wrongdoing.
See Wiggins, Delaware Director and Officer Liability Law, A "Windfall" for Directors, Legal
Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at 11, col. 1 (criticizing statute). But see Sparks, Delaware's Director
and Officer Liability Law: Other Statutes Should Follow Suit, Legal Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at
10, col. 4 (supporting statute). Exactly what the statute protects in this context is not altogether
clear. Id. If one includes a conscious disregard of a known risk in the definition of recklessness,
this might be a breach of good faith and liability flowing therefrom would not be exempt under
the statute. If, however, one only includes inattention in the definition of recklessness, it could
possibly amount to gross negligence, but not conduct amounting to bad faith, and hence be
protected conduct. See Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (1961) (non-affiliated
directors of mutual fund who were grossly negligent in failing to discover illegal transactions
were liable for losses even though they acted in good faith). But see Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d
878 (Del. 1970) (business judgment rule protects directors as long as decision made in good
faith); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963) (directors
must use amount of care that prudent men would use in similar circumstances).
141. See Letters from Black, Sparks & Johnston, partners at the firm of Morris, Nichols,
Arsht & Tunnell, to their clients (May 7, 1986). These letters also suggested that actual
amendments to certificates of incorporation would be of two types; one, which used the
statutory language verbatim, or a second, which incorporated the statute by reference and read
somewhat like this: "To the fullest extent permitted by Section 102(b)(7) of the D.G.C.L.
[Delaware General Corporation Law] as the same exists or may hereafter be amended, a director
of the corporation shall not be liable to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director." Id.
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Section 102(b)(7) authorizes limiting or eliminating monetary liability only
for directors who act in the capacity of directors.1 42 It does not limit the
liability of a director for acts or omissions in a capacity other than as a
director. 43 It does not apply to officers, employees, or agents except that
one who is a director and an officer may be limited to liability for acts done
in a directorial capacity. In the case of a director-officer, actions taken solely
in the capacity of an officer cannot be exempt from liability.'
The Delaware legislature has taken a much needed step toward protecting
directors of its corporations.1 45 Under prior law, the absence of a provision
such as section 102(b)(7) prevented shareholders from protecting their direc-
tors from unlimited personal liability. Directors previously were held to a
common law fiduciary standard over which shareholders had no control. 146
Under the common law principles, directors and shareholders had no means
of limiting the directors' liability. Eventually, the costs of fulfilling directorial
roles outweighed the benefits for many qualified individuals. If competent
directors are unwilling to serve because of an unreasonable risk of exposure
to their personal assets, the laudable policy of having independent directors
is seriously undermined. The true impact of section 102(b)(7), however, is
yet to be seen. The interpretation of the terminology in this section has been
left open for the judiciary. As the courts provide clearer definitions of the
duties of care and loyalty, one will be able to better predict the amendment's
impact on a corporation's ability to recruit qualified, independent directors.
III. IMPACT
This section will attempt to point out potential problems in the actual
workings of the new Delaware statute. These problems are seen most easily
in a corporate takeover context. Therefore, major decisions in the Delaware
Supreme Court 47 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concerning
corporate takeovers will be presented. 4 The cases will show the respective
courts' reasoning and how such analysis might differ under the new law.
Since the Delaware legislature wrote section 102(b)(7) in general terms, future
courts may be forced to take an active role in deciding how to construe the
law.
In spite of the provisions of section 102(b)(7), the statute does not foreclose
shareholders who wish to establish that their directors breached their fidu-
ciary duties. Basically, the new law allows a corporation's shareholders to
limit the personal liability of their directors for breaches of the duty of
142. See supra note 133.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Forty-eight percent of the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware. Addams,
The Fortune 500, Fortune, June 21, 1987, at 47.
146. See supra, note 62.
147. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
148. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
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care. 149 At the same time, however, the new law expressly forbids placement
of a limitation on liability for breaches of a director's duty of loyalty. 50 If
a shareholder of a Delaware corporation, which has adopted a provision
such as section 102(b)(7), files suit against a director of the corporation, the
suit should be phrased in terms of the duty of loyalty rather than broad
fiduciary duty or duty of care allegations.
The effectiveness of section 102(b)(7) appears hindered because courts
seem confused when differentiating between a breach of the duty of care
and a breach of the duty of loyalty. Courts in general, and the Delaware
Supreme Court in particular, are hard-pressed to define a breach of the duty
of care and/or the duty of loyalty.'"' Courts often call the breach a duty of
care violation and then support it with a duty of loyalty analysis or vice
versa. 5 2 Until these duties are delineated, section 102(b)(7) will have little
effect.
In order to demonstrate the weaknesses of section 102(b)(7), two different
takeover situations will be examined. In using the takeover context, one can
see how a board of directors is subject to intense pressure to make fast and
difficult decisions, and how outside considerations taint such decisions. First,
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc."' shows how the
Delaware Supreme Court confused the two types of fiduciary duties. The
significance of this confusion is that under the Revlon court's analysis, if a
board of directors that has adopted a provision akin to 102(b)(7) finds itself
in a pressure takeover situation, the board is not protected in many instances.
Since duty of care breaches are exempt while duty of loyalty breaches are
not, the protection section 102(b)(7) provides is ineffective if a court confuses
the two duties.
A. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
In a takeover scenario such as Revlon, the business judgment rule is
applicable. Therefore, the actions Revlon's board of directors took to thwart
the takeover attempt by Pantry Pride, Inc. remain subject to the duties of
loyalty and care. 54 In summarizing the steps Revlon's directors took in
149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).
150. Id.
151. See Revlon, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
152. Id.
153. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
154. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180. Of the fourteen Revlon board members, six held senior
management positions, two others held significant blocks of stock, and four others were
associated at some point with several entities that had business relationships with Revlon. The
court further mentioned that, "[O]n the basis of this limited record, however, we cannot
conclude that this board is entitled to certain presumptions that generally attach to the decisions
of a board whose majority consists of truly outside, independent directors." Id. at 176 n.3.
See also Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (ten out of thirteen outside directors
made plaintiff's burden heavy); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
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response to Pantry Pride's acquisition efforts,' one can identify those
actions taken before and after the break up of Revlon became inevitable.
This distinction is important because under the Unocal standards, 15 6 the
directors' role changes at this point from one of fulfilling the duty of
defending the corporate entity to the duty of getting the highest bid for the
shareholders.' 57
Before the breakup became inevitable, Revlon attempted various anti-
takeover tactics. In 1985, Revlon's board of directors reacted to Pantry
Pride's acquisition proposals, which Revlon considered grossly inadequate,
by adopting two plans. In the first plan, the company would repurchase up
to five million of its thirty million outstanding shares. 5 ' The second plan
allowed each shareholder to receive a Note Purchase Right (Right) for each
share of common stock which entitled the holder to exchange one common
share for a $65 principal Revlon note, to mature in one year at 12% interest.
These Rights became effective whenever anyone acquired beneficial owner-
ship of 20% or more of Revlon's shares, unless the purchaser acquired all
of Revlon's stock for $65 or more per share. 59 These Rights would not be
available to an acquiror. Also, prior to the 20% trigger event, the Revlon
board could redeem the Rights for 10 cents each. Revlon's board unanimously
adopted both proposals. 160
The board advised shareholders to reject Pantry Pride's subsequent offer, 61
and launched its own offer for up to ten million shares. It proposed to
exchange one senior subordinated note (Note) of $47.50 principal at 11.75%
interest, due in 1995, and one-tenth of a share of $9 cumulative convertible
exchangeable preferred stock valued at $100 per share for each common
share tendered. Revlon stockholders tendered 87% of all outstanding shares 162
and the company accepted the full ten million shares on a pro rata basis.
When the court reviewed the board's two plans, it noted that the board
had protected the shareholders from a hostile takeover at a price below the
company's intrinsic value, while retaining sufficient flexibility to address any
proposal deemed to be in the stockholders' best interests. 63 To that extent,
1985) (majority of the board were outside, independent directors which shifted burden of
persuasion to plaintiffs); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (evaluating "the
care, attention and sense of individual responsibility to performance of one's duties [to deter-
mine] independence"); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 694 (Del. Ch. 1971) (majority of
independent directors, consisting of four inside directors and five outside directors).
155. The plaintiff, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. was Pantry Pride's controlling
shareholder. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 n.l.
156. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
157. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
158. Id. at 177.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Approximately thirty-three million shares were outstanding at this time. Id.
169. Id. at 181.
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the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation.' 64
Meanwhile, as Pantry Pride continued to increase the value of its cash
bids, Revlon undoubtedly recognized that it would be broken up. The actions
of the Revlon board after this point were subject to scrutiny because of the
shift in emphasis of the board's duties from protecting the corporate entity
to maximizing the value that the shareholders would receive in a takeover.
First, Forstmann, Little & Co. ("Forstmann") offered a leveraged buyout
and the board unanimously agreed. The Forstmann agreement included a
payment of $56 cash for each share outstanding and the assumption of
Revlon's $475 million debt incurred when it issued the Notes. 165 Revlon, in
turn, would redeem the Rights and waive the Notes covenants for Forstmann
or for a higher offer by a third party. The announcement of this agreement
caused the market price of the Revlon securities to plummet.' 66
Second, as Pantry Pride continued to increase the value of its cash bids,
Revlon's board entered into a lockup option6 7 with Forstmann. Under the
agreement, Forstmann would purchase Revlon's Vision Care and National
Health Labs 61 if another aggressor obtained 40% of Revlon's shares. Revlon
was required to accept a no-shop provision, 69 to remove the Rights and
Notes covenants, and to place a $25 million cancellation fee in escrow.' 70
This fee would be released to Forstmann if the agreement was terminated
or if another acquiror obtained more than 19.9% of Revlon's stock. Forst-
164. Id.
165. The parties were not negotiating on an equal basis since Forstmann was privy to certain
Revlon financial data at that point, to Pantry Pride's exclusion. Id. at 178.
166. Id.
167. A "lockup option" is an arrangement by which the target corporation in a takeover
contest gives one proposed acquiror a competitive advantage over other bidders. Note, Lock-
Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HAgv. L. REV. 1068, 1068-69 (1983). Usually,
it involves granting the favored suitor (the "White Knight") an option to purchase the "crown
jewels" of the company (most productive or profitable divisions) at below-market rates. The
option is usually triggered if the aggressor buys more than a certain percentage of the target.
The aggressor is presumably after the target in order to gain the benefits of these "crown
jewels" which will no longer be a part of the target. These are also known as "scorched earth"
tactics. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)
(granting Merrill Lynch option to buy profitable pigments division). See also Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (lockups constitute a "manipulative" device
under the Williams Act). But see Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp.
1538 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding Mobil to be unwarranted extension
of Williams Act), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1062 (1984). For a more detailed analysis of lockup
options, see Fraidin & Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REv. SEc. REG. 821 (1981); Nathan,
Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups. The Search for Security in the Acquisitions Marketplace, 13 INST. ON
SEc. REG. 1, 4 (1982); Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1068 (1983).
168. Lazard Freres, Revlon's investment bankers, ascribed to the divisions a value approxi-
mately $100-175 million above the purchase price. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
169. The "no-shop" provision prevented the board of directors from searching for competing,
higher bids. Id.
170. Id.
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mann, in return, agreed to support the par value of the Notes by an exchange
of new notes. 17
1
Pantry Pride then took its battle from Wall Street to the courtrooms of
Delaware. Pantry Pride filed an amended complaint that challenged the
lockup, the cancellation fee, and the exercise of the Rights and Notes
covenants. 7 2 Pantry Pride also sought a temporary restraining order to
prevent Revlon from placing any assets in escrow or transferring them to
Forstmann.173 In holding for Pantry Pride, the trial court concluded that
Revlon's directors breached their duty of loyalty by making concessions to
Forstmann out of their concern for their personal liability to Noteholders,
rather than maximizing the sale price of the company for the shareholders'
benefit. 174
Revlon appealed this ruling to the Delaware Supreme Court. In reviewing
the board of director's actions, the supreme court first noted that when
operating in a takeover context, due to the "omnipresent specter" that a
board may put its own interests before those of the corporation or its
shareholders, "an enhanced duty exists which calls for judicial examination
at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may
be conferred.' ' 75 The court explained that this test is satisfied when the
directors show that the defensive measures are implemented with a proper
corporate purpose 76 and that such measures are reasonable in relation to
the threat posed. 177
The court essentially split the entire transaction into two main categories
consisting of: (1) Revlon's self-tender and the Notes and the Rights plans; 7 8
and (2) the lockup option, the no-shop provision, and the cancellation fee.
The court found the first group of transactions to have a valid corporate
purpose. 79 This is not surprising since a board of directors can usually find
171. 506 A.2d at 178-79.
172. 506 A.2d at 179.
173. Id.
174. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch.
1985). But cf. Revlon, Inc., v. Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804 (D.C. Del. 1985) (TRO
denied because target failed to show likelihood of success).
175. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
176. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
177. Id. Whether the court refined the Unocal test or only discussed the first step necessary
to receive protection under the business judgment rule remains unclear. No board may receive
the protection of the business judgment rule if it undertakes actions that the corporation has
not authorized. Id.
178. The court characterized the Rights plan as a "poison pill." A poison pill defense consists
of a target company's declaration of a dividend of convertible preferred stock to its shareholders.
Since this stock automatically becomes the successor's stock in a merger, and convertible into
that company's voting stock, it dilutes the control of the aggressor. See Dawson, Pence &
Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 Bus. LAW. 423 (1987). One study showed that ten
out of thirty-seven companies adopting poison pills experienced a change in control soon
thereafter. Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC, A Study on the Economics of Poison
Pills, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 83,971 (Mar. 5, 1986).
179. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181.
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an investment bank that will value the company at a higher figure than the
current market price. In this situation, the board could also assert that it
was maximizing shareholder value. The court found these measures to be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed, since Pantry Pride increased its
offers in response to the board's actions.8 0
The court, however, reasoned that the second set of defensive measures
were not undertaken for a proper corporate purpose since the board of
directors knew, or should have known, that the company was going to be
sold.' At this time, the "directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
shareholders."'1 2 These moves also were unreasonable in relation to the
threat posed in that, rather than spurring the bidding to new heights, they
effectively ceased the process.' 3
The court then proceeded to discuss the specifics of the lockup option
between Revlon and Forstmann. The board's alleged rationale for granting
this option was to shore up the value of the Notes because it also owed a
duty to the Noteholders. The court rejected this reasoning and held that the
duties owed to the Noteholders were fixed by contract. 4 The duties owed
to the shareholders, by contrast, should have been first and foremost, and
by neglecting them, the board breached its primary duty of loyalty.' 5 The
court then stated that "[T]he principal object, contrary to the board's duty
of care, appears to have been the protection of the noteholders' over the
shareholders' interests.''186
Thus, Revlon's directors apparently breached both their duty of care and
their duty of loyalty.8 7 The meaning of the Revlon court's decision, however,
is unclear. The court argued that the Revlon board was more concerned with
its potential liability to Noteholders, due to the decrease in market value,
than with its duties to shareholders. In doing so, the court used what appears
to be a duty of loyalty analysis (without the fairness component) to show
that the directors put their own interests above those of the corporation.
By arguing that the board should have recognized the imminent fall of
Revlon and thus sought the highest price for the shareholders' stock, the
court used an analysis that appears on its face to be a duty of care analysis.
Exactly which duty the board breached, however, is difficult to determine.
The relevant inquiry is whether the Revlon directors would have been pro-
tected (due to a duty of care breach) or not (due to a duty of loyalty breach)
if they had adopted a provision pursuant to section 102(b)(7).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 182.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 183.
184. Id. at 182.
185. Id. at 183-84.
186. Id. at 184.
187. Id. at 181-84.
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The duty of loyalty analysis in Revlon may be dicta since the decision
centers on the illegality of the particular crown jewel lockup option.' The
lockup basically had no relation to the Notes or the directors' liability to
the holders of those Notes. Therefore, even without the Noteholder versus
shareholder analysis, in all likelihood the board still would be liable. The
liability would have been based on the board's failure to act as auctioneer
and obtain the best deal for the shareholders.
Since the court's Noteholder analysis is akin to a duty of loyalty analysis
and is not relevant to the outcome, the question remains as to what basis
the court actually uses to hold the directors liable. In deciding that the crown
jewel lockup option was illegal in this case, the court again focused on the
purpose and reasonableness factors. But it did so in a manner that was not
the traditional duty of care analysis.
If the Revlon court intended a director's duty of care to include all of the
factors mentioned above except self-dealing, which then will be the only
component left in a duty of loyalty analysis, it is simply a duty of care case.
The reason for this confusion is that the Delaware Supreme Court, in its
analysis of the breaches that occurred, included both traditional duty of care
and duty of loyalty concepts. If Revlon had adopted section 102(b)(7), the
directors could not have been held personally liable because the court never
expressly stated which duty the directors breached. Without such direction
from the court, the statute is impotent because it can absolve a director's
duty of care violations but is powerless against a director's breach of the
duty of loyalty. If a court uses any analysis and yet calls it a loyalty analysis,
directors who have adopted section 102(b)(7) will be unscathed regardless of
their conduct.
If, on the other hand, the Revlon court intended a director's duty of care
to include all of the factors in the traditional business judgment rule, then
Revlon is not decided on either a duty of care or a duty of loyalty basis.
Rather, it is decided by independent judicial determination. In the future,
the corporate purpose portion of this new test might be fairly easy for a
board of directors to prove. 8 9 In light of Revlon, therefore, judicial deference
to the board probably would still exist here. However, the Revlon court
independently decided which measures were "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed." When deciding if the board's defensive tactics were reasonable
in relation to the threat posed, the Revlon court was engaged in what
appeared to be a "smell test." In other words, the court responded to its
gut reaction to the Revlon board's actions. This, obviously, is neither a duty
of care analysis nor a duty of loyalty analysis, but a case of independent
judicial determination.
188. See supra notes 149-50.
189. Boards have often maintained that a shift in the financial makeup of the balance sheet
is necessary and it has proved to be an impossible task to prove them wrong. Dawson, Pence
& Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 Bus. LAW. 423, 425 (1987).
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The Delaware legislature appears to have drafted the statute ambiguously
to allow the judiciary to decide the specific parameters of directors' duties. 190
Since most takeover decisions are mixed-motive decisions, they arguably
contain breaches of both the directors' duties of care and of loyalty. In light
of Revlon, it does not matter whether a shareholder or a rejected suitor files
suit against the corporation claiming a breach of a duty of care or loyalty.
The exact requirements of either of the duties are so malleable that one
could still sue under the Revlon facts and courts could then hold the directors
liable. Thus, in many situations, section 102(b)(7) does nothing to remove
the personal liability of a corporation's directors.
B. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.191
Like Revlon, Hanson is also set in a takeover context. Although the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case, the facts again demon-
strate the confusion between a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.
Hanson initiated a series of takeover tactics when it made an all-cash offer
for SCM. SCM and its white knight, 92 Merrill Lynch Capital Markets,
countered with a part-cash, part-debenture 93 offer. 9 4 In countering, the
SCM board granted a crown jewel lockup option 95 to Merrill which provided
that if any other party (in this case, Hanson) acquired more than one-third
of all SCM shares, Merrill would have the right to buy SCM's two most
profitable businesses. 96 Hanson then cancelled its tender offer and began to
purchase shares in the open market, which triggered Merrill's option to
190. The Delaware legislature appears to be mostly blue-collar. Section 102(b)(7)'s main
Senatorial sponsor was a steel-worker by trade. The Delaware legislature gives great deference
to the Delaware corporate bar which appears to be made up of a small number of Wilmington
and Dover law firms. In passing 102(b)(7), the Delaware legislative council librarian informed
this author that after a draft of the amendment was submitted by the Delaware State Bar
Association, the following sequence of events occurred: on day one the Senate debated the
draft for ten minutes; on day two the House debated it for five minutes; and on day three the
governor signed it into law. Telephone interview with Lynn Goldberg, Delaware Legislative
Council Librarian (Jan. 1987).
191. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986). See also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1985) in which Hanson's termination of a tender offer and immediate purchase of
large blocks of SCM stock did not violate the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1), (6) (1982).
192. See supra note 166.
193. A debenture is a bond backed by the general credit of a corporation and usually is not
secured by a mortgage or lien on any specific property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (5th ed.
1979).
194. 781 F.2d at 267.
195. See supra note 166.
196. 781 F.2d at 267. Merrill Lynch had an option to purchase the Pigments and Consumer
Foods divisions for $350 million and $80 million, respectively. Crown jewel lockup options
traditionally price the most profitable divisions at bargain basement prices. SCM appears to be
no different. There is evidence that Goldman Sachs & Co., SCM's investment bankers, thought
these prices were at the very bottom of a range of fair prices. Id. at 275.
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buy. 197 After Merrill's announcement that it would exercise the option,
Hanson announced a new tender offer and filed suit claiming that the
business judgment rule did not protect the SCM board's approval of the
lockup option, which was a breach of its fiduciary duties to the sharehold-
ers. 198
The Hanson court began its analysis by presuming that the case involved
a duty of care.' 99 The court did not even consider that the management
buyout, in response to the takeover threat, might present conflicts of interest
and, therefore, a breach of the duty of loyalty. However, while expressly
stating that this was a duty of care case, the court specified that the actions
of the SCM board did not rise to a level of gross negligence. 2°° The court,
therefore, implied that if SCM's board was only negligent, as opposed to
grossly negligent, the board still would have breached its duty of care. 20 1
SCM's shortfall, according to the court, was that the directors held a
three hour, late night meeting where they contented themselves with their
financial advisor's conclusionary opinion that the lockup option prices were
"within the range of fair value. ' 20 2 Had the directors inquired further, they
would have learned that the advisor had not even calculated a range of
fairness. 20 3 Moreover, the board never asked what the top value was, or why
two businesses that generated half of SCM's income were being sold for
one-third of the total purchase price of the company under the second
leveraged buyout agreement. 201
If this was truly a duty of care case, as the court stated, 20 5 it should have
deferred to the board's decisions under the business judgment rule. The
court could easily have found a proper business purpose. The leveraged
buyout and lockup option arguably also were related to the threat posed,
but the court did not give deference to SCM's board. Instead, the court
discussed the board's failure to look into ranges of reasonableness, fairness
197. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d at 52-54. Within hours following this
announcement, Hanson purchased approximately 250o of SCM's common stock from arbitra-
geurs and institutions. Id. at 52. Later that day, Hanson increased its holdings to over 3701o.
Id. at 53. '
198. 781 F.2d at 272.
199:"Id. at 273. See also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984)
(presumption of propriety inures to benefit of directors).
200. See supra note 128 ,and accompanying text. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 874 (Del. 1985) (board's approval of amendments to cash-out merger proposal deemed
gross negligence due, in'part, to failure to consider valuation information reasonably available).
201. See supra note 128land accompanying text discussing the negligence and gross negligence
standards.
202. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d at 275.
203. Goldman Sachs offered no written opinion as to the value of the two optioned divisions.
Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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of prices, and fairness to stockholders. 2°6 Essentially, the court engaged in
a duty of loyalty analysis. 20 7
The significance of Hanson lies in the court's confusion as to the duties
of care and loyalty. If SCM had adopted an article akin to Delaware's
section 102(b)(7), the outcome might have been different. If the court chose
to call what appears to be a duty of loyalty analysis a duty of care analysis,
the directors of SCM might not have been personally liable because section
102(b)(7) exempts directors from duty of care violations and not from duty
of loyalty violations. On the other hand, even if the court went through a
full scale duty of care analysis, the directors might still be personally liable
for breaches of their duty of loyalty, which is not protected by section
102(b)(7). In other words, even if the Hanson court had gone through the
purpose and reasonableness prongs of the care analysis, SCM's directors
could still be found liable for unfairness and conflicts of interest under a
loyalty analysis. 20
C. What Lies Ahead for Directors' Liability?
The Delaware legislature seems to have written section 102(b)(7) so that
courts could use as much latitude as possible. As the analysis of both Revlon
and Hanson attempts to demonstrate, interpretation of the new section will
not be an easy task for the courts. If courts correctly define both the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty analyses and proceed to apply them consis-
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 76-118 and accompanying text.
208. In order to demonstrate a situation where the new section 102(b)(7) should work exactly
as planned, one would be required to find a pure duty of care case. The celebrated case of
Smith v. Van Gorkom is probably the closest case. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Van Gorkom
involved Marmon Group's leveraged buyout of Trans Union Corporation. Trans Union's board
consisted of ten directors, five of whom were "insiders." Id. at 868. While they were all very
well informed about the company, none were investment bankers or financial analysts. Id.
The board convened a special meeting to consider the terms of the buyout, which lasted only
two hours. Id. at 869. The company's investment bankers were not invited. During the meeting,
no financial analysis or fairness advice on the proposed $55 price-per-share offer were given.
Indeed, no valuation study had ever been made. Id. Trans Union's Chief Executive Officer
(Van Gorkom), had determined the price solely on his own and the methodology by which he
arrived at this figure was never disclosed to the rest of the board at the meeting. Moreover,
the directors never received any documentation concerning the proposed merger or the adequacy
of the price. Id. at 874-75. Despite this lack of information, the directors approved the terms
of the buyout, and the merger agreement was thereafter executed by the CEO, who had never
actually read the legal documents.
In finding both the "inside" as well as the "outside" directors liable for a breach of the
duty of care, the court used a "pure" business judgment rule analysis (purpose and reasona-
bleness). The Delaware Supreme Court held that considerations of good faith are irrelevant in
determining the threshold issue of whether or not the directors as a board exercised an informed
business judgment. Id. at 890. The fact that a bidder has imposed a time limit will not excuse
uninformed board action. If, in a rare case, a court uses a straightforward business judgment
rule analysis of the duty of care, the statute will prevent directors' personal liability.
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tently, the consequences of a director's actions will be much more predictable.
Directors whose shareholders have adopted provisions similar to section
102(b)(7) will not only know where and how they will be held liable for their
actions, but they also will know how to react in given situations. Directors
will know that all courts expect a proper purpose for defensive actions the
board takes, and they will know that all courts expect the board's actions
to be reasonable in relation to the threat posed, which conforms to the
traditional duty of care analysis. Finally, they will know what constitutes
fairness and conflicting interests, factors encompassed in the traditional duty
of loyalty analysis. Unless courts adopt consistent standards to complement
section 102(b)(7), many boards in situations similar to those of the Revlon
or Hanson boards, will not know how to defend those to whom they owe
their greatest duties.
In order to give the greatest guidance to directors, courts should specifically
adopt the Revised Model Business Corporation Act's definition of duty of
care2°9 as well as the purpose and reasonableness components expressed in
Revlon.2 10 Courts also should adopt the Corporate Director's Guidebook2 '
definition of loyalty that includes conflicts of interest, fairness, corporate
opportunities, and confidentiality. Finally, the Delaware legislature should
reconsider its almost complete deference to the courts and adopt some
definitional statutes to aid the courts.
Since many of our nation's largest corporations are incorporated in Del-
aware, 2 2 they will have an opportunity to adopt an article under section
102(b)(7). 21 3 Also, some non-Delaware corporations will likely reincorporate
in Delaware to take advantage of the new protection offered. 21 4 For this
reason alone, courts should carefully use section 102(b)(7) as a tool to guide
directors.
209. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
210. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
211. Guidebook II, supra note 59, at 321.
212. See supra note 145.
213. For example, in Southern Company's Notice of 1987 Annual Meeting of Stockholders
and Proxy Statement, the Company proposed an amendment to its Articles of Incorporation
as follows:
Article NINTH .... A director shall not be personally liable for monetary damages
to the corporation or its shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty as a director
except (a) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
shareholders, (b) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (c) under section 174 of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware or any successor provision, or (d) for
any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
Notice from Southern Co. to Stockholders (March 1987). See supra note 135 (requirements for
amending certificate of incorporation).
214. For example, the Chicago Tribune reported that Stone Container Corporation sought
to change its state of incorporation to Delaware from Illinois. Stone Container's Chairman,
Roger Stone, said that the primary reason for reincorporating in Delaware was that its laws
afforded greater protection to directors. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 21, 1987, § 3, at 3, col. 2.
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Section 102(b)(7) will probably not reduce corporate takeover activity. The
new statute presumably will make directors more aware of the nature of
their fiduciary duties and to whom they owe such duties. Allowing incom-
petent management to complacently continue in its roles is an unlikely
possibility. In this respect, the new statute will not make corporate America
less efficient. Directors still will owe a duty of care to the corporation and
its shareholders. The net result will be to allow corporations to obtain the
best directorial talent because the directors will not be personally exposed
to liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The obligations a director owes to the corporation and its shareholders
fall into two broad categories, a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.
Historically, if a director breached either of these obligations he could be
personally liable for such breaches. In order to allow Delaware corporations
to continue to attract the best available talent, the Delaware legislature
adopted a statute whereby a corporation can amend its articles to eliminate
the personal liability of its directors for breaches of their duty of care. Since
the legislature did not define the duties of care and loyalty, courts need to
carefully craft case law so that directors know what their duties are in certain
situations and so that the new statute becomes a powerful corporate tool.
If, on the other hand, the courts use the latitude unwisely, continued
confusion in the area of the business judgment rule will result.
Jonathan W. Groessl

